diate concern, a penetrating analysis of the nature of intelligence and its relation to efficiency is essential to a satisfactory treatment of many other problems. Efficiency is now a popular catch-word in the criticism, not only of public administration, industrial organization, and productive processes, but also of educational procedure, where it has even been put forward to measure the value of the scientific output of university laboratories. Efficiency, its causes and its differentia, is a field of direct inquiry within the science of psychology.
Clear thinking and precise expression are difficult when we lack the necessary words to indicate differences which we know exist.
A vocabulary develops more slowly than our apprehension of differences. This is eminently true of the science of psychology, which has not as yet been able to produce a technical vocabulary that shall be both precise and adequate. In the present instance I believe that under the term efficiency are indiscriminately grouped two very different kinds of human performance. For the one I propose the word competency, for the other I would reserve the word efficiency. Dr. Eliot differentiates clearly enough the two kinds of performance. Thus he speaks of "the German method of efficiency all the way through industrial life giving instruction and training enough to produce the amount of skill needed for the daily task, and then enforcing that subjection of the worker which results in thorough co-ordination and co-operation in the complex processes of production. The efficiency of the military system is obtained in like manner by thorough training which leads to the instinctive cooperation of the individual with a mass of his comrades, and to an absolute obedience unto death." Of the "freer nations" he says, "The efficiency of all these nations is based on a high degree of personal initiative and of political and industrial freedom, not on the subjection or implicit obedience of the individual, but on the energy and good-will in work which result from individual freedom, ambition, and initiative." This is the kind of efficiency that I suggest we now call competency, a term which I have chosen after a careful consideration of other terms having a similar meaning, such as capability, aptness, etc. In one passage Dr. Eliot himself has not been able to dispense with the use of this word. In discussing the German system of education and government, he tells us that "under free governments and in communities which have a fair amount of social mobility, the rare men are surer to come forward into vigorous action," and continuing, he speaks of these men as "the men who are competent, not I propose to show that we need twelve scales in order to arrange in graded series all the differences in behavior under consideration. I shall first define the eight scales of performance level.
There are two growth scales of performance level: (1) the species scale; (2) the age scale.
When we say that a chimpanzee is more intelligent than a sheep but less intelligent than a human being, intelligence here means only relative complexity, variety, and number of the daily performances of these three species of animal. At the highest points on the species scale stand the various sub-species of human beings. Below man is the chimpanzee or gorilla, and immediately below this level the orang will probably be placed. Far below these range the horse, the cow, the sheep, the ant, the bee. Students of animal behavior will in time establish the relative position of all animals on the species scale.
An entirely different series of performance levels is obtained from the behavior of the infant, the child, the adolescent,^the adult, To arrive at a sound conclusion as to whether one operation is more important than another involves issues of fact and theory, which I can barely touch upon in this article. We are apt to consider that operations are more important when they are complex than when they are simple or elementary. Take for example, arithmetic. Everyone will admit that the child who can add or subtract with a satisfactory efficiency has taken only the first step toward learning how to employ arithmetic in his daily life. He must next learn how to use these elementary operations in solving problems, employing for the purpose not only his acquired proficiency in arithmetic but also the reasoning faculty. In time it may be possible for psychology to analyze the complex processes of reasoning into simple operations, and thus place us in a position to measure their efficiency. At the present moment, however, a child's efficiency and reasoning cannot be measured so as to be compared on equal terms with his efficiency in the elementary operations. We must be able to do this before we can arrive at a precise estimate of the relative importance of reasoning and ciphering as elements in an education.
Another difficulty in estimating relative importance arises from lack of agreement as to the purpose or aim of a process, such for example, as the educational development of an individual or the progress of a race or nation. The value, and hence the importance, of an operation, is determined with reference to the conceived end or object of the total process. We often raise the question whether vision or audition is the more important sense. This question can be debated because vision and audition are of nearly equal complexity, and the purposes which these two senses serve are sufficiently alike to allow us to estimate their relative value. When, however, we ask which is the more important, the sense of vision or the sense of hunger, we have asked a question very difficult to answer, because vision is a complex of many different processes and hunger is an elementary sensation. When we inquire, to what end??the difficulty is increased, because vision would seem to have greater value than hunger in our daily affairs, and yet as a matter of fact children born blind are easily reared to a fairly normal adult age, while children born without the sense of hunger would probably die in infancy. For these and other reasons, I think that questions of relative importance will remain for a long time matters of opinion rather than problems in scientific measurement.
Dr. Eliot's "highest efficiency," by which he means the efficiency of the more complex and socially important operations, rests upon intelligence, will, and moral purpose. Thus he considers a volunteer soldier more effective than a conscript, "because he has more personal initiative, more power of independent action, more sense of individual responsibility." "Personal initiative" is will.
"Independent action" is a product of intelligence and will. "Individual responsibility" is a moral quality. The part which intelligence plays in developing proficiency concerns my present discussion more directly than the will or differences in moral quality. In Dr. Eliot's estimation intelligence is a "power in free institutions which leads to efficiency." "Germany," he says, "has adopted, adapted, and used with great skill all the inventions of the free nations."
The German has seen that applied science makes for efficiency, and he has taken and used whatever he found wherever he found it.
He has therefore developed efficiency in a large number of important operations, displaying thereby his "will to efficiency," and that modicum of intelligence which is necessary for gaining information, and for adopting and adapting methods.
"Under free governments," however, and "in communities which have a fair amount of social mobility, the rare men are surer to come forward into vigorous action?the men who are competent, not only to invent or imagine the thing or the method that is next wanted, but to put their inventions into practical form and to make them useful in actual industries of their nations and the world." The issue with respect to intelligence is clearly and justly presented by Dr. Eliot, but when he goes on to assert that free institutions may also be expected to develop greater efficiency in industry and in governmental administration than autocratic governments, in my opinion he seeks to prove too much. Let us give the German nation its due, and grant the German more efficiency in a larger number of operations and a greater will to efficiency. We come then to Dr. Eliot's real argument, which is that autocratic nations are neither so inventive nor so resourceful as the freer nations. offense to the Germans.
In both German and Anglo-Saxon communities the individual is put under some measure of constraint by the "collective will," and both communities are in a measure free. The German has displayed his freedom once and for all by agreeing to submit to a large measure of constraint, enforced by the power of the State.
The Anglo-Saxon likes to be free to decide "on the spot" whether the "collective will" or his own will shall control his action. The German's self-discipline causes him to obey without question the posted order, "Keep off the grass." Long ago he made his choice with respect to that order and others of like nature.
The Anglo-Saxon considers each time the situation arises, whether his desire to walk on that particular plot of grass or his appreciation of the reasonableness of the mandate of the "collective will" shall determine his choice of action. 
